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| Plato, from Raphael's "School of Athens" |
The "Meno" starts off with the title character posing a question as to whether virtue can be taught, is the result of practice, or is inborn.
After a lot of twists and turns -- requests for definitions, attempts at definitions, debates on epistemology (how we come to know), a math demonstration, a section on virtue as knowledge and another contrasting "knowledge" vs. "right opinion" -- a concluding colloquy between Socrates and Meno proceeds as follows (from the Grube translation):
SOCRATES: ...if we were right in the way in which we spoke and investigated in this whole discussion, virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding, unless there is someone among our statesmen who can make another into a statesman. If there were one, he could be said to be among the living as Homer said Tiresias was among the dead [in Homer's Odyssey], namely, that "he alone retained his wits while the others flitted about like shadows." In the same manner, such a man would, as far as virtue is concerned, here also be the only true reality compared, as it were, with shadows.
MENO: That is and excellent way to put it, Socrates.
SOCRATES: It follows from this reasoning, Meno, that virtue appears to be present in those of us who may possess it as a gift from the gods. We shall have clear knowledge of this when, before we investigate how it comes to be present in men, we first try to find out what virtue in itself is. But now the time has come for me to go. [Emphasis added].
Socrates then asks Meno to pass his newfound realizations on to Anytus, which will be "for the benefit of the Athenians," as Anytus apparently wields some influence. The dialogue then ends.
According to R.E. Allen (1), the dialogue "ends in perplexity," and he calls it a piece of "dialectical irony," because Socrates concludes that even though he has asked and probed for a definition of virtue multiple times, these discussants could not produce a suitable answer as to "what virtue in itself is".
However, and this is my additional interpretation, some statesman who have this certain charisma, or "virtue," or "je ne sais quoi," as if as a divine gift, can pass it on to others. (Witness how our political leaders have performed such feats at the podiums of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions during the past two weeks!)
Thanks to our attendees for grappling with this text, one of the most challenging we've read over the course of the last 12 years.
P.S. Purely coincidentally, our reading last month of the "Prince" had many references to what Machiavelli in Italian called "virtù." Many thanks to Peter McGullam for noticing this interesting parallel between the readings. At the risk of sounding a little reductionist, I maintain that Plato's "virtue," like Machiavelli's "virtù," is of the "can do," not "goody-goody" kind.
(1) Allen, R.E., The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p.149.
