Some Afterthoughts on Our Discussion of Plato's "Republic"

Our reading selection focused on Socrates's discussion about justice with Glaucon and Adeimantus from Books II and IV of the "Republic," and hinges on a proof of the proposition that it is good to be just both for its own sake and for what comes of it. Here's Glaucon:

If life doesn't seem livable with the body's nature corrupted, not even with every sort of food and drink and every sort of rule, will it then be livable when the nature of the very thing by which we live is confused and corrupted, even if a man does whatever else he might want except that which will rid him of vice and injustice and will enable him to acquire justice and virtue? [Emphasis added]

Socrates has led the discussion to the point where to think otherwise would be considered, in his words, "ridiculous." Did Socrates set out to argue this point, or did he become convinced of it during the course of the discussion? It's a tough call in the Platonic dialogues.

We're left with a defense of "justice" (or "virtue," or "goodness," or whatever you choose to call it) arrived at through dialogue. It is an appeal to maintain order in one's soul ("the very thing by which we live") by means of the guidance of reason.

Shown above: Sculpture of Plato at the modern Academy in Athens. Below: Our group after its Socratic experience on the 26th of November.

Questions on Plato's "Republic"

Interpretive Questions

What does it mean for a person to be "just"?

Socrates says (p. 243) that there are three kinds of good: (1) things we desire for their own sake, ( (2) things we desire both for their own sake and because of what comes of them, (3) things we desire only because of what comes of them. Is this a useful construct in talking about justice? In which category does justice belong?

Why does Plato have Glaucon and Adeimantus believe it is better to be just than unjust before Socrates begins is argument. Isn't Socrates trying to persuade them to his view and away from theirs (p. 244)?

Does Socrates believe that a man who is unjust yet self-controlled, like Glaucon's perfectly unjust man, could actually exist? (pp. 247-248, 268-9)

Can one, according to Socrates, be just in a society that is not properly ordered?

Do the guardians act from altruism or self-interest? (p. 259-260)

Is Plato correct in ordering both the individual and society according to the reasonable, spirited, and appetitive parts of the soul?

Evaluative Questions

Should only a small group of wise and just men rule society?

Are some people cut out to debate amongst themselves and govern, and others to do manual labor?

Is it better to be just but perceived as injust, or to be injust and perceived virtuous?

Simon Blackburn has written, "Our future may well depend on how profoundly we respond to the 'Republic.'" Based on what you've read, what do you think of this statement?

For Textual Analysis

Pages 245 to 247, starting "They say that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering injustice naturally bad" to "So much for that."

Pages 264 to 266, "So we won't be irrational" to "and the many do so quite late."

Pages 267 to 269, "Then we must remember that, for each of us too, the one within whom each of the parts minds its own business will be just and mind his own business" to the end of the selection.

Questions on "Symposium," by Plato

Interpretive Questions

Why does Phaedrus (p.221) say that Love is a wonderful God and of all the proofs of this, the greatest is his birth?

What does Pausanius mean (p. 226) when he says, "Now it is the object of the Athenian law to make a firm distinction between the lover who should be encouraged and the lover who should be shunned"?

Why is Love personified in different places in the dialogue both as feminine and masculine (e.g., Pausanius talks of the two aspects of Aphrodite on p. 222, whereas Aristophanes refers to Love as a "he" on p.229)

Can you interpret Aristophanes's remark (p. 234), made after the fable about the sundering apart of the globular people, "for so may we ensure our safety and attain that blessed union by enlisting in the army of Love and marching beneath its banners."?

Why does Alcibiades say that the symposiasts are here to "try the man Socrates on the charge of arrogance" (p. 265)?

How do you interpret the remark by Alcibiades (p. 268) that "he's [Socrates] made fools of them all (i.e., "Charmides, Euthydemus, and ever so many more"), just as if he were the beloved, not the lover."

When Alcibides sat down there was laughter ("at his frankness," Plato tells us). Were the symposiasts laughing with him or at him?

What is Alcibiades's attitude towards Socrates, and does it change as he makes his discourse?

Is there a parallelism between Socrates's relationships with Diotima and Alcibiades?

Evaluative Questions

Socrates says (p. 236): "But in truth, it seems, is the last thing the successful eulogist cares about; on the contrary, what he does is simply to run through all the attributes of power and virtue, however irrelevant they may be, and the whole thing may be a pack of lies, for all it seems to matter." Is disdain for the facts really something successful eulogists have in common?

Is the whole history of how the narrative came about (i.e. that it was transmitted second-hand from Aristodemus to Apollodorus) important?

Is it significant that this symposium took place such a long time before?

Has anyone ever seen the "soul of beauty"?

For Textual Analysis

Pages 223-26, from "but I cannot help thinking, gentleman .... to ... shocked at the idea of yielding to a lover."

Pages 247-48, from "I'll try to speak more plainly, then, to ... Love is a longing for immortality."

Pages 252-255, from "Well, then, she began ... to if not, well, call it what you like."

Tips on Reading the "Symposium"

Plato's "Symposium" opens with Apollodorus saying "Oh, if that's what you want to know, it isn't long since I had occasion to refresh my memory." Apollodorus's friend wants to know what happened at a famous "symposium" (literally, a "drinking together") that had taken place some years earlier, and Apollodorus had recently related them to another friend, Glaucon.

Apollodorus had heard this story from Aristodemus, who was present at the drinking party held at Agathon's house to celebrate Agathon's prize in a playfest. Apollodorus then narrates, second-hand, the events of that evening. What follows are a series of discourses on love told in succession, in our version, by Phaedrus, Pausanius, Eryximachus, the playwright Aristophanes, the philosopher Socrates and the drunken latecomer to the party, Alcibiades.

That's the narrative frame of the piece. All this can be a little confusing to pick through, coming as it does at the very beginning, but once you figure it out, all you have left to get a handle on is the philosophy!

Another piece of advice comes from John M. Cooper, editor of Plato: Complete Works (Hackett Publishing, 1997). Cooper writes of the Platonic dialogues: "It is in the entire writing that the author speaks to us, not in the remarks made by the individual speakers" (p. xxiii).

It is a good idea, at any rate, to take a pencil and write in the name of each speaker (e.g. "Pausanias:") in order to keep straight whose words are whose.

Pronunciation Guide to the Characters of the Dialogue

AG-a-thon
Al-ci-BY-a-deez
A-pol-o-DO-rus
Ar-is-TOF-a-neez
Dy-o-TEE-ma
Er-ix-IM-a-kus
GLAU-con
Pau-SAN-i-as
FEE-drus

(This guide comes from Plato: Five Great Dialogues, B. Jowett, trans., Louise Ropes Loomis, ed., New York: Walter J. Black, 1942)